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ABSTRACT
The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance was introduced to improve the 
monitoring function of the board of directors, audit committee and the external 
audit. This study assesses the effectiveness of some board characteristics to 
monitor management behavior with respect to their incentives to manage 
earnings. We found discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management 
is negatively related to management ownership, but positively related to the 
existence of CEO-Chairman duality, after controlling for size, leverage and 
performance. The result shows multiple directorships factor is negatively 
related to earnings management proxy only in firms with negative unmanaged 
earnings. This implies multiple directorships factor is effective to detect 
earnings management practices to avoid losses. Examination of the data 
also shows that the ratio of independent board members is not significantly 
related to earnings management in firms with duality status. 
ABSTRAK
Kod Tadbir Urus Korporat diperkenalkan di Malaysia untuk meningkatkan 
keberkesanan fungsi pemantauan lembaga pengarah, jawatankuasa audit 
dan audit luaran. Kajian ini menilai keberkesanan ciri tertentu lembaga 
pengarah dalam memantau kelakuan pihak pengurusan berhubung dengan 
insentif untuk mengurus perolehan. Kajian ini mendapati akruan boleh pilih 
(yang menjadi proksi kepada pengurusan perolehan) mempunyai hubungan 
yang negatif dengan pemilikan pengurusan, dan mempunyai hubungan yang 
positif dengan kewujudan CEO-Pengerusi berdwi-peranan, setelah mengawal 
faktor-faktor saiz, leveraj dan prestasi. Hasil kajian juga menunjukkan bahawa 
faktor pengarah berbilang mempunyai hubungan yang negatif dengan proksi 
pengurusan perolehan tetapi hanya bagi syarikat yang mencatatkan perolehan 
tidak diurus yang negatif. Keadaan ini menggambarkan faktor pengarah 
berbilang adalah efektif bagi mengesan amalan pengurusan perolehan 
yang bertujuan untuk mengelak kerugian. Pemeriksaan ke atas data juga 
menunjukan nisbah ahli lembaga pengarah bebas tidak mempunyai hubungan 
dengan pengurusan perolehan dalam firma yang mempunyai CEO-Pengerusi 
berdwi peranan. 
INTRODUCTION
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After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, business community began questioning 
the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms within an organization. 
The crisis is followed by the two famous cases of Enron in 2001 and 
Worldcom in 2002. As a result, many believe that the existing corporate 
governance mechanisms are not able to provide sufficient control over the 
utility maximization behavior of managers through the practice of earnings 
management. In order to improve the monitoring function of corporate 
governance mechanisms in Malaysia, the Code of Corporate Governance 
was drafted in 1999 and subsequently approved in 2000 by the Ministry of 
Finance. The Code outlines some necessary conditions for the structure and 
functioning process of the board of directors, audit committee, and external 
auditors in safeguarding the interest of shareholders.
 This study examines the effectiveness of board of directors in mitigating 
earnings management practice within the regulatory and business environments 
in Malaysia. The study investigates several board characteristics and evaluates 
whether these characteristics have any relationship with the practice of 
earnings management. In particular, this study attempts to determine the extent 
to which the board of directors is able to limit the incidence of earnings 
management in firms with duality role status as opposed to those without 
duality role status. We used earnings management definition suggested by 
Healy and Wahlen (1999: 368) as “… managers’ use of judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of 
the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers.” In Malaysia, the research in this area is still lacking. 
Internationally, there is no single published research that has addressed the 
issue of the effectiveness of the board in monitoring the function of chairman-
managers with respect to earnings management. In this regard, this study 
makes a significant contribution towards understanding the interacting role 
of board characteristics.
 Compliance to the Code is not mandatory but disclosures of corporate 
governance statement are mandatory. However, any deviation from the 
best practice has to be explained in the annual reports (Malaysian Code 
of Corporate Governance 2000). The explanation on deviations from the 
best practice may give a bad signal to the market because it implies a poor 
management of the firm. Firms that intend to build a good image have to ensure 
that best practices outlined in the Code are complied. Thus, the disclosure 
requirement of corporate governance statement is in fact a mechanism to 
ensure compliance with the Code.
 This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
regulatory background of the financial reporting in Malaysia and the 
introduction of Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance. This is followed 
by a discussion of past studies and development of hypotheses about the 
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expected associations between some corporate governance characteristics 
and earnings management. Next, the research method and data collecting 
process are described, followed by a discussion of the empirical results and 
sensitivity analyses. The paper ends with a conclusion.
FINANCIAL REPORTING ENVIRONMENT IN MALAYSIA
The approved accounting standards issued by the Malaysian Accounting 
Standards Board (MASB) are basically developed based on the International 
Accounting Standards (IAS). In the early stage of the professional development, 
Malaysia modeled closely the UK financial reporting system with the emphasis 
given on the Companies Act 1965 in regulating the reporting practices 
(Takiah et al. 2003; Tan 2000). The Companies Act 1965 of Malaysia deals 
with fundamental rules governing procedures for incorporation, constitutional 
structure and dissolution of companies. The Act through the Ninth Schedule, 
which was revised in 1985, prescribes the minimum disclosure requirements. 
The directors have to present to shareholders an audited profit and loss 
statements, an audited balance sheet, a director’s report, a statement of 
changes in financial position and notes to the accounts. However, the Act 
does not make any reference to accounting standards issued by professional 
accounting bodies.
 During this early stage, the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) 
and the Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), then 
known as the Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants (MACPA), 
adopted the International Accounting Standards (IASs). In addition, customized 
Malaysian Accounting Standards (MASs) were issued to deal with domestic 
accounting specific issues. By 1997, a total of 24 IASs and 8 MASs were 
issued. However, there was no regulatory mechanism to enforce the compliance 
to these standards as mandatory (Tan 2000). A review mechanism was set 
up by both MIA and MICPA through their own Financial Statement Review 
Committee that conduct thorough reviews of financial statements prepared 
and audited by their members. Departures from approved standards may 
result in a formal enquiry being conducted and action may be taken if found 
guilty (Tan 2000). 
 In order to establish a regulatory mechanism, the Financial Reporting 
Act, 1997 was passed, under which the MASB was formed. The Financial 
Reporting Act (1997) sets out regulations about the financial reporting. It 
gives statutory power to the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) 
to issue reporting standards and made compliance to the standards mandatory. 
The MASB was given the authority to issue, review, revise or adopt accounting 
standards. With the establishment of MASB, all IASs previously adopted are 
reviewed and revised or replaced by standards known as MASB accounting 
standards. Both the Financial Reporting Act 1997 and the Companies Act 1965 
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(Amended) make mandatory the compliance to MASB approved accounting 
standards. As in the case of IASs, the MASB accounting standards mainly 
prescribe principles that companies must adhere for the purpose of financial 
reporting. Unlike in the U.S. and U.K., however, where companies have to 
follow detailed rules, MASB standards do not prescribed detailed rules to be 
closely adhered with by the profession. MASB accounting standards provides 
flexibilities for managers to use their discretions in determining the reported 
earnings. Consequently, this flexibility creates an ambiguity among the 
practitioners in the implementation of a specific standard, hence, leads to 
more earnings management practices (Ball, Kothari & Robin 2000).
 It is within the framework discussed above, accounting choices are 
selected. The selection of accounting choices to a large extent determines the 
quality of financial reporting. Choices of accounting methods and estimates 
enable the management to determine the level of income. Since the accounting 
income is often used in the contract between managers and shareholders, 
managers are predicted to have a strong intention to manipulate income 
numbers that would benefit them (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). For example, 
managers are found managing earnings upward to achieve a minimum level 
for bonus payment (Healy 1985). Since the manipulation is made within the 
boundary of permitted accounting treatments, this phenomenon cannot be 
classified as non-compliance or fraudulent reporting that can trigger actions 
by the authority. Therefore, it is the role of the board to ensure compliance 
with the standard as well as the choice of accounting methods and estimates 
that best reflect the underlying economic events.
CHARACTERISTICS OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The responsibility to ensure compliance of accounting standards rests on the 
directors of the firm. Section 166A(3) of Companies Act 1965 clearly states 
that “[T]he directors of a company shall ensure that the accounts of the 
company and, if the company is a holding company for which consolidated 
accounts are required, the consolidated accounts of the company, laid before 
the company at its annual general meeting, are made out in accordance with 
applicable accounting standards.” The MASB (S. 165 (15c) adds that directors 
must also make a statement that the accounts are prepared in accordance to 
the approved accounting standards. However, this provision was made only 
after an amendment to the Companies Act in 1998. In addition, directors 
are required to state whether provisions, write-downs, and write-offs were 
adequately made and whether there are material, and unusual events or 
transactions which would render the amounts stated in the accounts. 
 In order to ensure compliance with the statutory requirements discussed 
above, the Securities Commission (SC) of Malaysia has issued a guideline 
dealing with the disclosure policy, obligations after listing and matters related 
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to accounting standards and valuation or revaluation of assets. The guideline 
requires companies to comply with accounting standards and the minimum 
disclosure requirement in the Companies Act 1965. Companies listed on 
the Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) 
are also required to comply with the Listing Requirements. Similar to the 
SC requirements, the annual audited accounts have to be prepared according 
to approved accounting standards and the Ninth Schedule of Companies 
Act 1965. With effect from July 1999, other additional requirements are 
introduced such as submission of quarterly reports and disclosures of certain 
transactions including material contracts, breakdown of shareholders, and 
properties held. 
 In summary, directors are responsible to ensure financial statements 
are prepared according to approved accounting standards. It is noted that 
the applicability of accounting standards is very flexible. The management 
may choose an acceptable accounting method or estimate that is appropriate 
for the need of the organization. In this respect, the compliance with the 
accounting standards may not necessarily mean that financial statements are 
free from manipulation. Thus, the compliance of accounting standards as 
required in the SC Guidelines and the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 
may reduce the propensity to manage earnings but may not eliminate the 
entire practice of earnings management. Therefore, it is important that the 
board of directors carry out its monitoring role effectively in order to ensure 
that financial reporting provides quality information to users by reflecting 
proper underlying economic substance of the company transactions. 
 In order for the board of directors to function effectively, certain 
characteristics are suggested within the structure of corporate governance. 
Efforts to develop better guidelines for the corporate governance in Malaysia 
have been intensified in the late 1990s. One of the Malaysian government 
initiatives was to introduce corporate governance into the regulatory framework 
with the objective of enhancing accountability and transparency by the 
management of company. The Finance Committee Report on Corporate 
Governance issued on 25 March 1999 sets out the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance. The Code of Corporate Governance was gradually 
enforced on the listed firms by Bursa Malaysia in 2001 (Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange changed its name to Bursa Malaysia in 2004). 
 The major component of the principles and best practices of good 
governance includes some benchmarks of board of director’s characteristics 
(Table 1). The five main characteristics of board of directors refer to board 
composition, board size, directors’ ownership, number of directorships and 
duality status of the chairman and CEOs. The extent to which these principles 
and best practices are effective in enhancing the credibility and quality of 
corporate reporting is still an empirical question. Therefore, this study attempts 
to examine this issue within the Malaysian context. The question remains 
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 Characteristics  Description of best practices
Chairman and Chief  There should be a clearly accepted division of
Executive Officer responsibilities at the head of the company, which will 
 ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no one 
 individual has unfettered powers of decision. Where the 
 roles are combined there should be a strong independent 
 element on the board. A decision to combine the roles of 
 Chairman and Chief Executive should be publicly 
 explained. 
Board size Every board should examine its size, with a view to 
 determining the impact of the number upon effectiveness. 
 (There is no prescribed numbers of directors should be on 
 the board). 
Board composition Non-executive directors should be persons of caliber, 
 credibility and have the necessary skill and experience to 
 bring an independent judgment to bear on the issues of 
 strategy, performance and resources including key 
 appointments and standards of conduct. To be effective, 
 independent non-executive directors need to make up at 
 least one-third of the membership of the board. 
Number of  There is no prescribed limit on the number of directorships 
directorships a manager can have. However, the nominating committee 
 is advised to assess the suitability of the candidates based 
 on the person’s other commitments, resources and time 
 available. 
Director’s ownership There is no exact figure determined as the maximum 
 ownership of the board of directors. However, significant 
 ownership implies non-independence (para 4.23).  
Source: Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2000.
TABLE 1. Some best practices benchmarks of board of directors
whether board of directors with certain characteristics can mitigate management 
to avoid losses. This study attempts to examine the relationship between 
the characteristics of board of directors and earnings management within 
the Malaysian environment. The study seeks to test whether independence 
of members of the board and other board characteristics can limit earnings 
management in firms with duality status compared to firms without duality 
status.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
An important role of the board of directors (BOD) is to eliminate conflicts 
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between principal and agents (Fama & Jensen 1983). Conflicts exist when 
the principal or shareholders wish to get maximum wealth, whereas the 
agents or top managers wish to maximize their own compensation, wealth 
and rewards. Therefore, monitoring and controlling are devices to eliminate 
the conflicts (Fama & Jensen 1983; Jensen & Meckling 1976).
INDEPENDENCE OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The components within the board are essential ingredients for effective 
monitoring. The appointment of managers as directors (i.e. insiders) is 
important because they have more information about the organization 
compared to outside directors. However, domination by insiders may lead to 
transfer of wealth to managers at the expense of the stockholders (Beasley 
1996; Fama 1980). Therefore, outside directors are appointed on the board 
mainly to obtain independent monitoring mechanism over the board process 
thereby reducing agency conflicts and improve performance (Craven & 
Wallace 2001). Consistent with this theory, results in prior studies suggest that 
outside directors are positively related to abnormal stock return (Rosentein 
& Wyatt 1990) and performance (Dalton et al. 1999) and negatively related 
to fraudulent reporting (Beasley 1996). Similarly, there is a negative relation 
between outside directors and earnings management (Klein 2002). 
 However, there are critics on the role of non-executive directors on the 
board. Some believe that they perform little role in monitoring the board 
because lack of real independence, time, as well as enough information 
(Gilson & Kraakman 1991; Patton & Baker 1987). We delineate the issue 
of non-executive directors by examining the role of independent and non-
executive directors on the board. Of course, to be effective, independent 
non-executive directors should have both, strong incentives to monitor the 
board, and the capabilities to identify earnings management (Peasnell et al. 
2000a). The need to maintain director’s reputation in the competitive market 
for directors provides incentive for independent non-executive directors to 
monitor the board, failing which would increase the likelihood of dismissal 
(Fama 1980). In addition, there is no tangible benefit that accrues to the 
independent non-executive directors from earnings management. Peasnell et al. 
(2000a) report that independent non-executive directors have the capabilities 
to detect earnings management since most of them are familiar with financial 
reporting issues by holding senior management positions in other firms.
 Therefore, we test the relation between the independent non-executive 
directors on the board and earnings management within the Malaysian context. 
The Companies Act 1965 requires every company to have at least two directors 
without any stated requirement on the composition of the board. A survey by 
KLSE/Price Waterhouse in 1998 shows almost half (49%) of the companies 
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have two independent directors and 23% have three independent directors. 
Directors independence is assessed from two perspectives: 1) the executive 
power (being part of the management); and 2) significant shareholding (para 
4.23 Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance). The listing requirement in 
Malaysia clearly defines independent director as a director who is independent 
from the management, free from any business or other relationship which 
could interfere with the exercise of independent judgment. Therefore, the 
hypothesis stated in alternative form is as follows:
H
1
: Ceteris paribus, the ratio of non-executive and independent directors to 
 total board members are negatively related to earnings management 
CEO DUALITY
Another strand of research examined the role of CEO who is also the chairman 
of the firm. Prior research studies such as Gul and Leung (2004), Booth et 
al. (2002) and Ho and Wong (2001) refer this phenomenon as CEO duality, 
whereby one person assumes two roles (as a CEO and as a chairman). Agency 
theory suggests separation of duties may lead to efficient monitoring over 
the board process (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1993). In the absence 
of a separation between the chairman role (as oversight and governance 
mechanism) and the CEO role (as decision management) the monitoring 
function of the board over earnings management may be jeopardized because 
the CEO has more discretion to manipulate financial reports (Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni 1994). In such a firm, the CEO has more power over the board and 
firm without being supervised and evaluated by a chairman. 
 However, empirical findings do not consistently show a negative impact 
from duality. It was found that the change in duality status does not influence 
the market (Balinga, Moyer & Rao 1996). While Daily and Dalton (1997) 
found CEO duality status does not have significant effect on performance, 
Worrel, Nemec and Davidson (1997) document a negative relationship between 
CEO duality and firm performance, which is consistent to agency theory. In 
contrast to agency theory but consistent to organization theory, Finkelstein 
and D’Aveni (1994) suggest that some boards prefer duality because of 
coordination problem if CEO and chairman are separated. In addition, there 
will be less interference in the management of the firms with duality status 
and these firms can depend on strong boards to provide sufficient checks 
(Haniffa & Cooke 2002). However, Brickley et al. (1997) argue that while 
agency costs of having a CEO and chairman duality is eliminated, separation 
of the leadership structure introduces another cost i.e. cost associated with 
controlling the behaviour of non-CEO chairman. The issue of whether a strong 
board can monitor the behaviour of CEO-Chairman will be deliberated later 
in this paper.
In summary, it is still an empirical question of whether duality reflects poor 
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corporate governance in a firm that may results in higher earnings management 
in Malaysia. Due to the importance of this issue, the new Malaysian Code 
of Corporate Governance did not encourage the practice of CEO duality. As 
the best practice, both roles should be clearly separated (para 4.18 Malaysian 
Code of Corporate Governance). Since the investigation in this study is on 
the monitoring function of the board over earnings management and not the 
relationship between duality and performance, we follow agency theory for 
the prediction. Check and balance mechanism is important to detect earnings 
management. Consistent with agency theory, prior research studies predict a 
positive relationship between CEO-duality and earnings management (Xie et 
al. 2003). Hence, we hypothesize the following:
H
2
: Ceteris paribus, CEO duality is positively related to earnings 
management
SIZE OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Prior studies also suggest that there is a relation (although mixed) between 
firm performance and size of the BOD (Pierce & Zahra 1992). Smaller boards 
are argued to be more effective because they have less difficulty coordinating 
efforts (Jensen 1993; Yermack 1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren & Wells 1998). 
 However, larger boards are also claimed to have information and expertise 
advantage over smaller boards (Pierce & Zahra 1992). In bankruptcy context, 
failed firms are found to have smaller boards than survivor firms (Chaganti 
et al. 1985). In a study using meta analysis to aggregate results across 27 
studies with 20,620 firms, Dalton et al. (1999) found that firm size has a 
positive relationship with firm performance. They argue that larger board has 
more external linkage, ability to extract critical resources such as funding, 
and expertise or experience in running the business and these attributes 
could lead to higher performance. Since Dalton’s et al. (1999) study used 
aggregated results across many studies, it serves as an important landmark 
in determining the direction of board size-performance relationship.
Our study explores the role of BOD size in mitigating earnings management. 
Consistent to resource dependence theory and Dalton et al. (1999), we 
hypothesize that there should be a negative relation between the size of the 
board and earnings management practices in Malaysia, as follows:
H
3
: Ceteris paribus, the size of the board is negatively related to earnings 
 management
MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS
The market for directors provides incentives for outside directors to be a 
good monitor over the management of a firm (Fama 1980). The reward is 
the offer of additional directorships. Therefore, Beasley (1996) used multiple 
directorships as a measure of the reputation of a director in monitoring 
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managers. From this point of view, multiple directorships should be negatively 
related to earnings management. 
 On the other hand, multiple directorships may also results in less time 
for effective monitoring (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1988), thus more earnings 
management can be expected. However, the maximum number of directorships 
that a director can hold without jeopardizing his/her ability to monitor is 
not mentioned anywhere in the literature. In line with this argument, Bursa 
Malaysia issued Practice Note 13 (PN13) in 2002. The Practice Note states 
that for a listed firm, the maximum number of directorships is ten in public 
listed firms and fifteen in private limited firms. Therefore, the probability 
to find a director with excessively many directorships is expected to be 
lower only after the introduction of this requirement in 2002. Hence, with 
the maximum number of directorships being imposed, the negative effect of 
multiple directorships is expected to be reduced.
 We include this variable to test whether multiple directorships do in 
fact influence earnings management. Since the period under study is before 
the implementation of PN13, multiple directorships can influence earnings 
management in both ways, thus the following hypothesis:
H
4
: Ceteris paribus, multiple directorships is related to earnings 
management
MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that separation between stock ownership 
and control over public firms creates conflict of interests between managers 
and stockholders. The conflict arises when managers have the incentives to 
increase their own wealth (for example through maximization of bonuses) 
at the expense of shareholders. As the proportion of managerial equity 
ownership increases, the interests of the shareholders and managers start to 
converge. Consistent with this theory, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found a 
positive relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership 
structure. In addition, Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995) found a negative 
relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management. Result 
in Beasley (1996) reveals that as outside directors’ ownership increases, 
financial statement fraud decreases. 
 It is a duty of the chief executives and directors of a listed company to 
disclose their interests in the company to the SC failing which may result 
in a criminal sanction of up to RM1 million or imprisonment of up to 10 
years, or both (Section 99B of the Securities Industry Act 1983). As such, 
the data on directors’ ownership is readily available from annual reports. 
The following hypothesis is therefore developed:
H
5
: Ceteris paribus, managerial ownerships is negatively related to earnings 
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 management
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT TO AVOID LOSSES
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) in the U.S. and Norman, Takiah and Mohd 
Mohid (2003) in Malaysia have examined the distribution of earnings 
and found there is discontinuity around zero. The result indicates there 
is a tendency for managers in Malaysia to use accruals in order to avoid 
reporting losses and earnings decreases. This study extends the findings 
by examining whether certain board characteristics can limit or promote 
such behavior. We identified firms that have negative unmanaged earnings 
(earnings – discretionary accruals). These firms are expected to have a strong 
incentive to manage earnings upward in order to report a positive earnings 
figure. We examine whether good board characteristics work as effective 
mechanisms in these firms compared to firms that have weaker incentives 
to manage earnings. In other words, we test whether managerial incentives 
have a moderating effect on the relationship between board characteristics 
and earnings management practices. We expect the relationship between 
board characteristics and earnings management proxy is stronger in firms 
with strong managerial incentives to manage earnings compared to firms 
with weak incentives. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
H
6
: Ceteris paribus, the relationship between board characteristics and 
 earnings management is stronger in companies with negative unmanaged 
 earnings than in those with positive unmanaged earnings.
INTERACTION BETWEEN CEO DUALITY AND  
OTHER BOARD CHARACTERISTICS
The Code also requires that in the case when both CEO and chairman roles 
are combined, the board should have strong independent members and it 
should be publicly explained. Therefore, we also test this requirement, whether 
independent members and other board characteristics can limit earnings 
management in firms with duality status. This interaction factor may be the 
explanation for inconsistent results found in previous research studies (such 
as Daily & Dalton 1997; Worrel, Nemec & Davidson 1997).
 There could be other strong board characteristics exist in firms with CEO 
duality status and serve as an effective monitoring mechanism over the board. 
Under this situation, it could lead the study to find no significant relationship 
between CEO duality status and earnings management proxy because strong 
board characteristics may have successfully eliminated earnings management. 
In contrast, firms may not require having strong board characteristics when 
CEO and chairman roles are separated because sufficient control mechanism is 
already in place. This substitutability role of board characteristics is discussed 
in Pierce and Zahra (1992) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). Therefore,
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H
7
: Ceteris paribus, the relationship between board characteristics and 
 earnings management is stronger in companies with CEO duality than 
 in those without CEO duality status.
RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA
Earnings can be managed using real transactions such as asset sales and/or 
accelerating or deferral of revenue and expenses using accounting methods and 
estimates (Peasnell et al. 2000b). The effect of the latter method accumulates 
in accruals. One advantage of using accruals to manage earnings is that it is 
difficult and costly for the users to unravel accounting numbers in order to 
make economic decisions. Therefore, accruals are more likely to be used by 
managers to manage earnings than structuring actual transactions. We follow 
recent research studies in earnings management by focusing on accruals 
manipulation (Klein 2002; Xie et al. 2003). We use the definition by Healy 
and Wahlen (1999) throughout the paper that earnings management reflects 
opportunistic behavior of the management. Nevertheless, we acknowledge 
that some accounting choices and estimates may be used to signal private 
information.
 Prior research often partitions total accruals into accruals that result 
from managerial discretion (discretionary) and those which are not (non-
discretionary). The partitioning components of total accrual (TACC) into 
non-discretionary accruals (NDAC) and discretionary accruals (DAC) for firm 
i can be summarized as follows:
 TACC
i
 = NDAC
i
 + DAC
i
 (1)
 Total accruals for firm i are computed as the difference between income 
before tax and extraordinary ordinary items (EARN) and operating cash flows 
(OCF):
 TACC
i
 = EARN
i
 – OCF
i
 (2)
 This study utilizes the model referenced by many accruals management 
studies, that is, Jones (1991) model. This model explicitly control for firms’ 
performance. In addition, among competing models, Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1995) and Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996) provide evidence that 
this model outperform other models in detecting induced manipulations. This 
expectation model for non-discretionary accruals is given in the following 
equation:
 TACC
i
 /A
i-1
= α
1
(1/A
i-1
) + α
2
(ΔREV
i
/A
i-1
) + α
3
(PPE
i
/A
i-1
) + υ
i 
 (3)
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 However, there are several drawbacks of the model that are worth noting. 
One of the main disadvantages of the original Jones (1991) is survivorship 
bias. Time series estimation needs only firms with sufficient time-series data 
to be included in earnings management research. For example, Jones (1991) 
selects firms with at least 10 time series data points for estimation. This 
requirement leads earnings management studies to select only well established 
firms (usually large in size), while earnings management may also exist in 
newly established and small firms. 
 In addition to the survivorship bias, there are other concerns about the 
original time-series formulation. In summary, it includes: 1) serial correlated 
residuals, that is self-reversing property of accruals that may induce 
specification problems to the Jones and modified Jones models (Peasnell 
2000b); 2) the coefficient estimates on the change in revenue (ΔREV), and 
the property, plant and equipment (PPE) variables are unlikely to be stationary 
over time; and 3) there are also confounding effects in the estimation periods, 
which are unrelated to earnings management (Dechow et al. 1995; Guay et 
al. 1996).
 Therefore, to deal with the survivorship bias and non-stationary of data 
over time, this study adopts a cross-sectional version of Jones (1991) model 
as suggested by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), Subramanyam (1996), and 
Peasnell et al. (2000a and 2000b). The above equation is estimated cross-
sectionally for each industry portfolio utilizing all firms listed on the KLSE 
industrial classifications (Rees, Gill & Gore 1996; Subramanyam 1996; 
Young 1995; Kasznik 1999). The abnormal accruals (DAC) are determined 
as the prediction errors (u
i
). These abnormal accruals are also identified as 
the proxy for earnings management in the hypotheses.
 The cross-sectional version of the models improves the power of the model 
to detect manipulation due to increased observations (Jeter & Shivakumar 
1999; Bartov, Gul & Tsui 2001). The cross-sectional regression in each 
industry portfolio also eliminates industry-specific effects when the accruals 
behavior and the impact of the economy vary across industries. However, the 
cross-sectional version of the models has several weaknesses, for example, it 
is less probable that the models will capture: 1) mean reversion in accruals; 
2) dynamic accrual management strategies; and 3) industry-wide earnings 
management (Peasnell et al. 2000b).
 One main difference of this study from previous studies is in the use of 
net PPE level at the end of the period because the gross value of PPE is not 
available from the database. To get a gross PPE, it is necessary to undertake 
a lengthy process of calculation from the information available in the actual 
annual report, which is not available in many cases. Furthermore, depreciable 
buildings are reported together with non-depreciable land as one-line item in 
the notes. Nevertheless, Culvenor, Godfrey and Byrne (1999) find that the net 
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PPE is a good surrogate for the gross PPE for earnings management research. 
DAC is then regressed on identified factors in the previous section. We run 
one regression on board of director variables controlling for size, leverage 
and performance (descriptions about all variables are shown in Table 2). 
 Hypotheses are tested using a multivariate regression model. We include 
Extbrd as the ratio of independent non-executive directors to total members on 
the board, to measure the independence of the board. Since the Code specifies 
firms to disclose the type of board members in the financial reports, the data 
is extracted manually from the annual reports. The duality as represented by 
Duality is a dummy variable, being 1 for firms with duality status, and 0 
otherwise. The size of the board (Sizebrd) is measured by the actual number 
of members on the board. We use the effect of multiple directorships using 
Multidir. This variable is measured as the ratio of members on the board 
Variables  Definition  Operationalization Expected 
      association 
1. Size A proxy for political cost Log 10 of total assets - 
2. Perform Operating performance Return on total assets at t-1 + 
3. Lev Leverage Log 10 of the debt to total 
   assets ratio + 
4. Duality CEO-Chairman duality Dummy variable being 
   1 for firms with CEO-
   Chairman duality and 0 
   otherwise + 
5. Extbrd A proxy for board  External members to total
  independence board members - 
6. Sizebrd The size of board of Total number of directors 
  directors on the board - 
TABLE 2. Variables definition and operationalization
with multiple directorships (more than two directorships) to total members. 
We do not use a more precise measure such as the average number of 
directorship held by the members because the information may not be 
appropriately disclosed. Thus, we have doubt about the completeness of the 
data. Management ownership (Mgtown) is measured as the actual percentage 
of total ownership held by the management. 
 Control variables are also included in these models as earnings 
Earnings Management and Board Characteristics 91
management represented by DAC are found to be related to size, performance 
and leverage (Young 1998). Consistent with political cost hypothesis (Watts 
& Zimmerman 1986), larger firms are expected to adopt more income 
decreasing accruals to reduce political vulnerability. Thus, DAC is predicted 
to have a negative relationship with size. 
 According to debt covenant hypothesis, firms near to violate their debt 
covenant are expected to adopt income-increasing accruals in order to avoid 
covenant violation (DeFond & Jiambalvo 1994; Watts & Zimmerman 1986). 
Therefore, DAC is expected to have a positive relationship with a measure of 
the proximity to debt covenant. The variable often used as proxy is leverage 
(Duke & Hunt 1990). In this study, we include Lev (debt to total assets ratio) 
in the multivariate regression.
 Although Jones (1991) model explicitly controls for firm performance 
through DREV
i
, Dechow et al. (1995) and Kasznik (1999) suggest that firm 
performance tends to have a positive relation with DAC. Without appropriately 
controlling for performance, DAC may simply reflect changes in the sample 
firm’s performance. Thus, performance (Perform) measured as the prior 
period’s operating profit before tax divided by the book value of total assets 
at the end of the period is included in the analysis.
The model is as follows:
Model: DAC
i
 = α
1
 + α
2
Size
i
 + α
3
Perform
i
 + α
4
Lev
i
 + α
5
Duality
i
 + α
6
Extbrd
i
 
 + α
7
Sizebrd
i
 + α
8
Multidir
i
 + α
9
Mgtown
i
 + e
i
 
 Data required for DAC estimation was collected from Datastream, while 
corporate governance data was collected based on actual published annual 
reports downloaded from the Internet. The link to published annual reports 
is available from the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) announcements 
web site. We use data from year 2001 soon after the disclosure about 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance was mandated. We acknowledge 
that the non-adoption of the code in this year may influence the results. We 
then match DAC data from Datastream with the corporate governance data 
manually collected. This procedure yields 561 firms with complete data. The 
industry distribution of this final data set is presented in Table 3. Since the 
distribution shows some industry concentration, the effect was controlled in 
the estimation of DAC. In addition, we also test the stability of the multiple 
regression result utilizing industry dummy variables. Consistent with prior 
studies (for example, Peasnell et al. 2000a; 2000b), we exclude firms in the 
Finance industry since the industry is highly regulated and the behavior of 
accruals differs from other industries.
RESULTS
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The estimation of DAC was made according to industry portfolio separately. 
The mean coefficient on DREV is 0.146 with all industries exhibit a positive 
association to DAC. For the PPE, the mean coefficient is –0.193 with five out 
of seven estimations have a negative association to DAC. These results are 
consistent with DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994). The descriptive statistics of 
DAC are given in Table 4. 
 Average DAC stood at –0.007, while the median is 0.016 from prior 
year’s total assets. Examination of the skewness and kurtosis shows significant 
non-normality exists. This conclusion is reached after testing the distribution 
Industry Data included in the analysis 
Construction 58 
Consumer products 92 
Industrial products and technology 194 
Plantation and mining 33 
Properties 60 
Trading and services 124 
Total 561
TABLE 3. Industry distribution of the data
using the Jarque-Bera test. Winsorizing the data to the same value at 1% and 
99% as well as trimming the top and bottom 1% of the data decrease the 
Kurtosis significantly but the non-normality problem remains. Therefore, in 
order to use the estimated DAC, we use normalization procedure described in 
Cooke (1998) following Van der Waerden approach. This procedure effectively 
assigns ranks to non-normal data and transforms ranks with numbers on 
normal distribution.
 Table 4 also shows the descriptive statistics of the continuous variables 
 Variables Mean Median Standard Deviation 
 DAC -0.007 0.016 0.166 
 Size 5.460 5.345 0.592 
 Perform -0.002 0.022 0.096 
 Lev -0.912 -0.808 0.716 
 Extbrd 0.589 0.571 0.191 
 Sizebod 7.560 7.000 2.168 
 Multidir 0.568 0.667 0.317 
 Mgtown 0.103 0.020 0.158 
Note: All variables are defined in Table 2.
TABLE 4. Descriptive statistics of continuous variables (n=561)
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used in the regression. It appears from the Table that about 57% to 59% of 
the board members are non-executive from an average total number of the 
board members, between seven to eight persons. More than half of these 
members have multiple directorships. The data also shows that nearly 45% 
of the firms have their chairman who also acts as CEO (duality). This result 
is lower compared to the results in U.S. studies. In the U.S., Brickley et al. 
(1997) and Xie et al. (2003) found more than 80% of their sample firm-years 
have CEO duality.
 Correlations between independent variables are given in Table 5. The 
association between two continuous variables is assessed using Pearson 
correlation, between a continuous variable and a binary variable using point 
biserial correlation and between two binary variables using Phi correlation 
(Welkowitz, Ewen & Cohen 1991). 
 Table 5 shows that there are some significant correlations among the 
independent variables. The highest correlation is between Perform and Lev is 
–0.519 (p<0.050), suggesting better performing firms have lower leverage. The 
correlation between Extbrd and Duality is also significant (with correlation 
coefficient –0.396). This correlation shows that as the ratio of independent 
members on the board increases, the occurrence of CEO duality decreases. 
This result implies that with more effective external monitoring, the internal 
monitoring mechanisms also improve. We include these variables in one 
regression since the correlation is not too strong (lower than 0.700). However, 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests were carried out.
 Table 6 shows the multivariate regressions of DAC on the independent 
variables described earlier. All models exhibit a significant relationship between 
 Size Perform Lev Duality Extbrd Sizebod Multidir Mgtown 
Size 1.000        
Perform 0.218*** 1.000       
Lev -0.182*** -0.519*** 1.000      
Duality -0.149*** -0.043 0.070 1.000     
Extbrd 0.136*** -0.018 -0.034 -0.396*** 1.000    
Sizebod 0.325*** 0.332*** -0.219*** -0.111*** 0.000 1.000   
Multidir 0.193*** 0.075 -0.124*** -0.094** 0.059 0.100** 1.000  
Mgtown -0.192*** 0.114** -0.014 0.118*** -0.161*** 0.036 -0.122*** 
1.000
TABLE 5. Correlations of independent variables (n=561)
DAC and Size, Perform and Lev. This result supports earlier studies that more 
income decreasing accruals is associated with larger sized firms i.e. political 
costs hypothesis, and more income increasing accruals is associated with 
lower leverage firms i.e. debt covenant hypothesis (Zmijewski & Hagerman 
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1981; Lilien & Pastena 1982; Skinner 1993). The coefficients are between 
–0.168 and –0.501 for Size, and between 0.176 and 1.312 for Lev, all of 
which have p < 0.010. Theoretical foundations for these predictions are 
found in Watts and Zimmerman (1986). We acknowledge that Jones (1991) 
model may not fully capture the changes in accruals that are related to the 
changes in performance. Thus, we incorporate a variable to control for this 
effect in all regressions. Consistent to our concern, it appears from the result 
that Perform is positively related to DAC.
 Unlike the result in Xie et al. (2003), we found CEO-Chairman duality 
to have significant influence on earnings management. The difference in 
the result may be due to the high proportion of firms with duality in the 
U.S. (more than 80%) to the extent that it may not capture variance in the 
DAC. The coefficient on Duality is 0.153, significant at p< 0.010. Thus, H
2
 
is supported. This finding reflects the need to strengthen the compliance to 
the Code that relates to the duality status of the BOD. Although the Code 
clearly restricts managers from holding these two posts, duality persists in 
practice, and the CEO-Chairmans are managing earnings more than firms with 
the two roles separated. 
 Consistent with prior research, we found a negative coefficient on 
management ownership (-0.744, p-value < 0.010). This result supports H
5
. 
The result suggests less earnings management practices as the managements’ 
and shareholders’ interests converge. 
 The relation between DAC and Extbrd is however, not significant, thus 
H
1
 is not supported. However, this result is consistent to the argument by 
Monks and Minow (1995) that independent non-executive directors have 
no significant economic ties to the firm beyond their job as directors. This 
implies that to be an interested and effective director, they should hold shares 
in the firm.
 The adjusted R2 is 22.3% indicating that only a marginal portion of the 
variability of DAC is explained by the independent variables. This figure is 
however, normal for any earnings management studies utilizing discretionary 
accruals as proxy (Peasnell et al., 2000a). The highest Variance Inflation Factor 
is only 1.403 suggesting there is no serious multicollinearity problem. Kennedy 
(1998) suggests VIF of more than 10 indicates harmful collinearity.
 Since results in Norman, Takiah and Mohid (2003) show that firms are 
managing earnings to avoid reporting losses, we test the relationship between 
board characteristics and earnings management proxy on sample partitioned 
according to positive and negative unmanaged earnings (UME). We measure 
unmanaged earnings as reported earnings before tax and extraordinary items 
minus DAC. We expect that earnings management to avoid reporting losses 
only occur in sub-sample UME less than zero. Therefore, the relationship 
between board charaacteristics and earnings management is stronger in 
companies with negative UME than in those with positive UME (H
6
).
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 The sample was partitioned according to negative and positive UME results 
resulting in 249 firms with positive UME and 310 firms with negative UME. 
Two firms with UME equals zero were excluded from the analysis. The results 
in the second column of Table 6 show that Multidir and Size are significantly 
negatively related to earnings management proxy only in negative UME firms. 
This result suggests the experience of directors with multiple directorships 
only play their active role in mitigating earnings management in firms that 
recorded negative unmanaged earnings. This could be due to the risk of 
director replacement is higher in loss making firms than their profit making 
firms (Gilson 1990). Thus, in the market for directors, earnings management 
attempt would tarnish their own image and put their future at risk. 
 However, in contrast to our earlier expectation, we found a positive 
association between Extbrd and DAC in negative UME firms. The result 
suggests the higher the ratio of independent non-executive directors on the 
board, the higher the DAC. We examine this issue further in the additional 
analysis section. 
 With regards to the effectiveness of board characteristics to mitigate 
earnings management in firms with CEO-Chairman duality status (H
7
), the 
results are presented the Table 6 (column 5 and 6). Similar regression 
was run on the sample partitioned according to duality status of the firm. 
The results show that board independence is not significant in both sub-
samples. This suggests the requirement stated in the Code that firms need 
to have a strong independent directors when duality exists is not effective to 
mitigate earnings management. However, we also acknowledge that strong 
independent members of the board may not simply be translated into the 
ratio of independent non-executive members to total board members. Strong 
members may imply dominant and active independent members. Investigation 
into this issue is subject to further in-depth research utilizing other methods 
and measurements.
 However, Lev is not significant in firms without duality status. This 
indicates that firms do not use accruals to increase earnings to avoid covenant 
violation when their CEO and Chairman roles are separated. In contrast, Lev 
has significantly positive relation to earnings management in the sub-sample 
with duality status. 
SENSITIVITY AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
To assess the stability of the results, regressions were run without using normal 
transformation stated earlier. However, the data was trimmed at the top and 
bottom 1%. The results of the corporate governance variables are qualitatively 
similar to the one reported in Table 6. Alternatively, we also use winsorizing 
technique to deal with outliers. Winsorizing does not eliminate outliers but 
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limits their effects. We winsorized the data to a point that is equivalent to 
the value of 1% and 99% of the ranked data. The result is also stable.
 We also assess the effect outliers using RSTUDENT, COVRATIO and 
DFFITS based on regressions of original data. An observation is deemed to be 
influential and deleted if it has RSTUDENT > 2, |COVRATIO – 1| ≥ 3 p/n and 
DFFITS ≥ √ 2(p/n) where p is the number of parameter and n is the number 
of observations. Utilizing this procedure, we deleted 7 observations from the 
model. The Adj R2 increases to 25.2%. The result is qualitatively similar to 
the one previously reported. The effect of heteroscedasticity is controlled 
using White’s (1980) procedure. The White’s (1980) adjusted t-statistics 
show that all results are similar to earlier estimations.
 The effect of industry concentration mentioned earlier was also assessed 
using industry dummy variables. Adj R2 increases to 23.3% and there are two 
industries, which show significant association to DAC. The most significant 
industry is Consumer Products, with –0.426 (p < 0.005), followed by Trading 
and Services (-0.364, p < 0.010). Construction industry variable was excluded 
from the regression and all other industries recorded a negative coefficient. 
These results may imply that compared to the construction industry, all 
other industries recorded more negative DAC. This could be due to firms 
in the construction industry may have just recovered from a crisis which 
gave a great impact on the industry. Therefore, these firms may experience 
a reversal of negative accruals as well as accumulating positive accruals in 
the growth period. All variables found significantly related to DAC in earlier 
result remain unchanged.
 The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance requires firms to have at 
least one-third of the board represented by independent non-executive directors 
(para 4.22 Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance). On average, Malaysian 
firms have surpassed this threshold before the Code was issued. Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) report the mean (median) ratio of independent non-executive 
directors to total board members in 1995 is 45% (43%). Nevertheless, we 
test whether the magic number (one-third threshold of representation by 
independent non-executive directors) do have significant influence on earnings 
management. We use a dummy variable to represent firms with more than 
one-third independent non-executive directors. The result shows insignificant 
relationship between the dummy variable and earnings management. This 
suggests one-third threshold of independent non-executive directors is not 
an effective measure to achieve board independence.
 Since we found a positive association between Extbrd and DAC in negative 
UME firms, we investigated this issue further. For firms with a negative UME, 
their DAC may be positive and negative. Positive DAC may imply their intention 
to avoid losses, whereas negative DAC may indicate manager’s intention to 
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take a bath. We suspect the unexpected result could be driven by independent 
directors successfully limit big bath practice using DAC (higher proportion of 
independent directors associated with higher DAC). Therefore, we partitioned 
negative UME firms according to positive (217 firms) and negative (94 firms) 
DAC. We found results consistent with our concern. The coefficient on Extbrd 
is only significantly positive in firms with negative DAC (0.604, p <0.010). 
In contrast, the coefficient for Extbrd in firms with positive DAC is 0.040, 
not significant at conventional level. The results imply that in firms with 
negative DAC, the higher proportion of independent directors the higher the 
DAC (becoming less negative). This result manifests independent directors 
successfully limit big bath practices in negative UME firms.
 We explore the possibility of Extbrd variable may not capture the role 
of independent non-executive directors when they act as majority in the 
board meeting. These directors may not be effective to control the board’s 
decision when they are the minority compared to the situation when they 
are the majority. In addition, Klein (2002) found the most appropriate cut 
off level for directors’ independence is at 51%. Compared to other cut off 
points, director’s independence using the 51% level produces the highest 
relationship with discretionary accruals. Therefore, we test whether director’s 
independence is better proxied by a majority representation using this cut off 
point (BRD51). We replaced Extbrd with BRD51 and re-run the regression. 
The result shows that BRD51 is not significant with coefficient 0.056 and p 
= 0.474. This result suggests that board’s independence does not have any 
influence on earnings management in Malaysian firms.
CONCLUSION
As a response to the recent financial crisis, the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance was introduced to improve the monitoring function of the board 
of directors, audit committee and the external audit. This study assesses the 
effectiveness of some governance characteristics to monitor management 
behavior with respect to their incentives to manage earnings. We also 
examine the effectiveness of board characteristics when the incentives to 
avoid losses are strong. This study also extends prior research by focusing 
on the relationship between earnings management and board characteristics 
in firms with and without duality status.
 We found discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management 
is negatively related to management ownership but positively related to the 
existence of CEO-Chairman duality. The findings indicate there is a need to 
strengthen these elements of corporate governance. The Bursa Malaysia has to 
enforce the requirement to have separate chairman and CEO roles. However, 
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regulators cannot force managers of firms to hold the firm’s stock. Other than 
their own willingness to buy the firm’s shares, management ownership can 
increase through the issuance of bonus shares and Employee Stock Option 
Scheme (ESOS), both of which have certain limits. 
 When the incentive to avoid losses is strong, the experience of managers 
with multiple directorships is important as a monitoring mechanism. This 
experience should be encouraged but monitored so that it would not result in 
less attention on the firm. Nevertheless, the optimum number of directorships 
that can limit earnings management practices is subject to future research.
 The results also show that more independent directors representation on the 
board cannot limit the action of CEO-Chairman towards earnings management 
practices. These two characteristics are not substitutable. Therefore, the Code 
has to be more specific about the characteristics of independent directors that 
may have a strong influence on the action of CEO-Chairman. Otherwise, the 
duality role of CEO-Chairman has to be totally eliminated.
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